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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent historical research casts doubt on whether District of
Columbia v. Heller1 was rightly decided according to originalist methods.
These new discoveries put originalists in a bind. Not the “faint-hearted
originalists.”2 They will be fine. They have already concluded that as
between the need for stability in prior decision making, settled
expectations, and the coherence of the law, some adulterated decisions
must remain enforced for the greater good.3
No, these new discoveries are going to be hardest on stout-hearted
originalists. The ones who declared Heller an original public meaning
masterpiece.4 The ones who cannot abide the weak soup of “living
originalism,”5 “framework originalism,”6 or “inclusive originalism.”7
* Melvin G. Shimm Professor of Law, Duke Law School. Thanks to Joseph Blocher, Jake
Charles, and Alison LaCroix for comments on this Article. Thanks also to Neil Siegel and Mitu
Gulati for discussing some of the jurisprudential and empirical issues with me.
1. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
2. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989)
(“I hasten to confess that in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist.”).
3. Of course, it may be that some originalists find that their hearts grow most faint when
the precedent coincides with their ideological priors, but that’s an observation for a different
paper.
4. See Alan Gura, Heller and the Triumph of Originalist Judicial Engagement: A Response
to Judge Harvie Wilkinson, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1127, 1128 (2009) (“For Heller is a significant
triumph for exactly those principles that judicial conservatives have long espoused.”). Cf. David
Harmer, Securing a Free State: Why the Second Amendment Matters, 1998 BYU L. REV. 55, 101
(1998) (“[T]he great weight of available evidence indicates that the Second Amendment means
what it says[]”); Alfred J. Lechner, Jr., Commentary, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 853, 853 (2000)
(“The Second Amendment means what it says.”).
5. See generally JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3 (2011) (defining living
originalism as a method of interpretation that is “faithful to the original meaning of constitutional
text,” but also “consistent with a basic law whose reach and application evolve over time”).
6. Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 549, 550 (2009).
7. William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2355 (2015)
(defining “inclusive originalism” as allowing judges to look to “precedent, policy, or practice, but
only to the extent that the original meaning incorporates or permits them.”). For a discussion of
1
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The ones who—when confronted with precedent that is historically
unsound or unsupported (whatever their ideological inclinations)—
believe that the precedent must go and a new, purer decision based on
originalist reasoning must prevail.8 It is these originalists who are going
to struggle most with this new research on the right to keep and bear arms.
For them I can only say—deal with it. The Court owns Heller now.
The Court cannot point to the linguistic usages of eighteenth-century
Americans and claim their hands are tied, because all the linguistic
evidence suggests the Court got it wrong. This does not mean the Justices
must overturn Heller—there are plenty of cases in the constitutional
canon that rest on shaky factual foundations9—but it does mean they must
accept their role in fashioning working rules to implement the right to
keep and bear arms. The Second Amendment is in the Court’s hands.
How it develops—for good or ill—will be a function solely of the wisdom
with which the Court articulates its mandates.
II. HELLER DUBITANTE
The Second Amendment is one of the most recognized portions of the
United States Constitution: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed.”10 For over 200 years, the Amendment was legally,
if not politically, inert.11 It was a right mediated by duties to participate
in a militia; it was not motivated by private purposes like hunting,
collecting, or self-defense. No firearm regulation was successfully cut
down by the pen of a federal judge in those 200 years.12 In reported
different forms of “constitutional compromises” with and within originalism, see Lawrence B.
Solum, Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism: The Conceptual Structure of the Great
Debate, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1243, 1284–86 (2019).
8. See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1981 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L.
REV. 1, 22 (2007) (“[T]he constitutional case against precedent is not absolute. But it is mostly
absolute.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22
CONST. COMMENT. 289, 289 (2005) (“Stare decisis contradicts the premise of originalism—that it
is the original meaning of the words of the text, and not anything else, that controls constitutional
interpretation.”).
9. See Dale Carpenter, The Unknown Past of Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1464,
1465 (2004) (“In every important respect [the legend of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)]
is terribly incomplete or very questionable.”); Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity by
the Numbers: The Warren Court’s Empirical Legacy, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1309, 1320–21
(2002) (discussing some of the problems with the social science that underpinned Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
11. JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A.H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND AMENDMENT:
RIGHTS, REGULATION AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER 13 (2018).
12. See United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 614 (N.D. Tex. 1999), rev’d, 270
F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 1002, 1003 (W.D. Ark. 1939), rev’d,
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opinions, only Chief Justice Roger Taney13 and Justice Clarence
Thomas14 clearly spoke of the right in individual, classical liberal terms.
The one Supreme Court case to directly address the question in that time,
United States v. Miller,15 resonated with the militia-centric view.16
Retired Justice Lewis Powell, Jr. delivered a speech lamenting handgun
violence, and called for more handgun regulation, stating: “It is not easy
to understand why the Second Amendment . . . should be viewed as
creating a right to own and carry a weapon that contributes so directly to
the shocking number of murders in our society.”17 Retired Chief Justice
Warren Burger was less restrained, calling the personal purposes reading
of the Second Amendment a “fraud” perpetrated by lobbying
organizations like the NRA.18
That all changed in 2008 in District of Columbia v. Heller, when a
five to four majority of the Supreme Court held, for the first time, that the
Second Amendment covers a right to keep and carry a firearm in the home
for purely personal purposes like self-defense.19
In Heller, Justice Scalia applied his original public meaning
originalism to the Second Amendment.20 This was not your grandfather’s
originalism—the originalism of Ed Meese and the Federalist Society in
its salad days.21 That “old” originalism sought to find the intentions of
the likes of James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and (even though he
was not at the Constitutional Convention) Thomas Jefferson.22 But old

307 U.S. 174 (1939). This statement does not include the lower court case that led to Heller, of
course. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 401 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
13. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 416–17 (1857), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
14. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 938 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring).
15. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
16. Id. at 178.
17. Josh Getlin, No Constitutional Right to Ownership, Ex-Justice Says in Speech: Powell
Calls for Stricter Control on Handguns, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 7, 1988), http://www.latimes.com/
archives/la-xpm-1988-08-08-mn-187-story.html.
18. See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 683 (2009) (quoting remarks
of Burger in MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour: First Freedoms (PBS television broadcast Dec. 16,
1991)).
19. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 629.
20. See id. at 576–77.
21. See The Hon. Edwin Meese III, Attorney General of the United States, Address before
the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society Lawyers Division at 3, 6, 8 (Nov. 15, 1985),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/08/23/11-15-1985.pdf (describing “a
jurisprudence of original intention”).
22. See Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 720
(2011) (“[I]n its early days, originalism was understood as a mandate to interpret the Constitution
to mean what the Framers intended it mean . . . .”); see also Martin H. Redish & Matthew B.
Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation, and the Democratic Dilemma:
Proposing A “Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1485, 1496 (2012) (“[W]hile the
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originalism suffered crippling practical and theoretical problems.23
Individual intentions are hard to identify and are unstable over time.24 For
example, Madison the Founder thought the Bank of the United States was
unconstitutional, while Madison the President was not so concerned.25
Plus, the Constitution did not have one drafter: it was drafted and debated
in a convention, so multiply the opaque and varying intentions of one
person by fifty-five (or thirty-nine if you only count the signers of the
1787 Constitution).26 Further, even if these epistemic problems could be
resolved, the intentions of the drafters are not what make the Constitution
law.27 So, although it remains the stuff of Twitter commentary and
televised punditry, by the time of Heller, old originalism had slipped from
the center of both originalist scholarship and jurisprudence.
Enter the “new” originalism. The “new” originalism substituted
historical linguistics for the Framers’ intentions.28 It relies upon two
propositions. First, that linguistic meaning is fixed at the time the relevant
language is ratified; second, that the linguistic meaning is determined by
what ordinary speakers, writers, and listeners of language would have
understood them to mean at that time.29 This “new” originalism reflected
writings of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson are considered evidence of the original intent of
the Framers, neither man even attended the Philadelphia Convention.”).
23. Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 616 (2008) (“The
old originalism succumbed to a series of criticisms—about the difficulty of aggregating individual
intentions, about the inevitable incompleteness of the historical record-whose combined effect
was to undermine its claim that only it offered an interpretive approach that avoided judicial
subjectivity, judgment, and choice.”).
24. Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J.
1085, 1087 (1989) (“One initial problem is whether we can determine the original intent with any
confidence.”).
25. See Colby, supra note 22, at 722 (observing that the turn to a new originalist theory
“helped to ameliorate the concerns about the illegitimacy of government by unexpressed
intent . . . .”).
26. See Farber, supra note 24, at 1089 (“The difficulty of determining the plausibility of a
historical interpretation is increased by the need to interpret the collective views of a diverse group
of individuals.”).
27. See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 375 n.130
(1981) (citing JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 17–18 (1980)) (conceding that it is
the “intention of the ratifiers, not the Framers,” that is actually the decisive issue); see also Ronald
D. Rotunda, Original Intent, the View of the Framers, and the Role of the Ratifiers, 41 VAND. L.
REV. 507, 512 (1988) (“When we talk popularly about the framers’ intent, we really should be
more precise and refer to the ratifiers’ intent[.]”). But see Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism Without
Text, 127 YALE L.J. 156, 158 (2017) (arguing the Constitution is “the law of the United States as
it stood at the Founding, and as it’s been lawfully amended since[,]” which may or may not
involve text).
28. See James C Phillips, Daniel M. Ortner & Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics &
Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J. F.
21, 21–22 (2016), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/corpus-linguistics-original-publicmeaning (defining original public meaning originalism).
29. See id.
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Justice Scalia’s textualist commitment (which is not necessarily the same
as originalist commitment30) that only the words as enacted and
understood by the law giver—the people themselves31—are the law.
“Words must be given the meaning they had when the text was
adopted.”32
This notion of a “fixed meaning,” ascertainable by objective methods,
immune to the whims of politics or judges is, and remains, new
originalism’s chief allure.33 One cannot falsify “people should have rights
to bear arms for individual self-defense.” One can falsify “speakers of
English in 1791 typically used the phrase ‘bear arms’ to mean for
individual self-defense.” And it is that falsifiable claim that Justice Scalia
used to anchor his Heller opinion.34
In Heller, Justice Scalia began by stating “the Constitution was
written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used
in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.”35
He conceded that “[n]ormal meaning may of course include an idiomatic
meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings that would not have
been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation.”36
He then broke the Second Amendment in two, identifying the
“operative” portion—“the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed”—and a prefatory portion—“[a] well-regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State . . . .”37 Only if the operative
portion was ambiguous was it necessary to resort to the prefatory
portion.38 Parsing the terms “people,” “keep,” “bear,” and “arms,” Justice
Scalia concluded that the ordinary meaning of “keep and bear arms” to a
person in 1791 was to keep and carry weapons for purposes of personal

30. See Sachs, supra note 27 (discussing a method where one can be originalist without
reference to text).
31. Or rather, those who count at the time, which in 1787 clearly did not include AfricanAmericans or women, among others. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 230 (1980).
32. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXT 78 (2003).
33. Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Semantics and the Meaning of the Second Amendment,
THE PANORAMA (Aug. 3, 2008), http://thepanorama.shear.org/2018/08/03/historical-semanticsand-the-meaning-of-the-second-amendment/.
34. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 570, 576–77.
35. Id. at 576 (citing United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)).
36. Id. at 576–77.
37. Id. at 577.
38. See Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas:
The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 746 (2013) (noting
that this applies a 19th century linguistic approach to an 18th century text, which alone is an
unorthodox maneuver if the task is to find out how 18th century writers understood what was
written).
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confrontation.39 He stated that because this meaning was unambiguous
and indubitable, no resort to the preface for clarification was necessary.40
The majority concluded, “whatever else [the Second Amendment] leaves
to future evaluation, it surely elevates above all other interests the right
of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and
home.”41
But Heller did not mean to bring all regulation crashing down. The
majority offered assurances that
nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying
of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.42
These “presumptively lawful regulatory measures” were merely
“examples.”43 Other, unidentified measures could arise in post-Heller
litigation.
Justice Stevens challenged the majority’s conclusions about what the
ordinary meaning of the term “bear arms.”44 He first noted that “[t]he
stand-alone phrase ‘bear arms’ most naturally conveys a military
meaning unless the addition of a qualifying phrase signals that a different
meaning is intended. When, as in this case, there is no such qualifier, the
most natural meaning is the military one . . . .”45
The majority admitted that the military interpretation was possible,
but that a military or collective meaning was unambiguously understood
only when the phrase was “bear arms against.”46 Because the Second
Amendment did not use the terms “bear arms against,” it was likely that
a military meaning was not understood. But Justice Stevens pounced,
stating that “[t]he Court does not appear to grasp the distinction between
how a word can be used and how it ordinarily is used.”47 The question
was not how “bear arms” was most clearly or unambiguously used, but
instead how the term “bear arms” was ordinarily used, which the

39. Heller, 544 U.S. at 584, 595.
40. Id. at 578 n.4, 579.
41. Id. at 635.
42. Id. at 626–27.
43. Id. at 627 n.26.
44. Id. at 649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 586.
47. Id. at 649 n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223,
242 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (some internal quotation marks, footnotes, and citations
omitted)).
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linguistic evidence showed, was in a military sense.48 Moreover, even if
the term “bear arms” was ambiguous, the prefatory clause “a wellregulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a Free State” clarified
its meaning.49 The right was dependent on the institution of a wellregulated militia, not private purposes.
I have read the majority opinion in Heller numerous times, and on
every reading it gets worse. Many writers, even ones who support the
outcome, have howled at the undefended list of “presumably lawful
regulatory measures” plunked down near the end like some originalist
deus ex machina.50 As Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III wrote shortly after
the decision, “[t]he Heller majority seems to want to have its cake and
eat it, too—to recognize a right to bear arms without having to deal with
any of the more unpleasant consequences of such a right.”51 Troublesome
too, is the jackalope manner in which Justice Scalia leverages midnineteenth century materials to justify an argument about eighteenth
century linguistic meaning.52 That is perfectly acceptable if Heller was
candid about applying a living or evolutionary theory of constitutional
law,53 or perhaps some kind of trans-generational intratextualism,54 but it
is peculiar, if not outright heresy, for someone who famously celebrated
the “dead” constitution.55
Unquestionably, this “triumph” of originalism contained fissures from
the get-go.56 Those cracks have grown ever wider57 as ten years of

48. Id. at 649–50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49. See id. at 643–44.
50. See United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1049 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J.,
concurring) (“In what could be described as the opinion’s deus ex machina dicta, Heller simply
declared that nothing in it ‘cast[s] doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of
firearms by felons’ or various other gun control laws.”); see also Nelson Lund, Civil Rights: The
Heller Case, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 293, 304 (2009) (“[W]ith regard to these exceptions to the
right to arms, we seem to have a case of verdict first and trial later, if at all.”).
51. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA.
L. REV. 253, 273 (2009).
52. See Cornell, supra note 38, at 746.
53. Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1574 (2009) (“The living
Constitution strongly supports the Heller majority’s recognition of an individual right to keep and
bear arms.”).
54. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Second Amendment: A Case Study in Constitutional
Interpretation, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 889, 890 (2001) (“[T]he words and deeds of the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . when read in conjunction with the Second Amendment, support an individual
right to have a gun in one’s home for self-protection[.]”).
55. See Scalia Vigorously Defends a ‘Dead’ Constitution, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 28,
2008, 4:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90011526?storyId=900
11526 (“Let’s cut it out. Go back to the good, old dead Constitution[.]”).
56. See Winkler, supra note 53, at 1557, 1558.
57. As Justice John Paul Stevens pointed out, just two years after Heller, scholarly
consensus was that Heller got the history wrong. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742,
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linguistic and historical research have steadily eroded Scalia’s
masterpiece.58 Whereas a decade ago the linguistic briefing on the
meaning of “bear arms” was confined to a sample of just 115 sources,59
today, through big data sets of historical materials—like the Corpus of
Founding Era American English (“COFEA”), the Corpus of Early
Modern English (“COEME”), and Google books—historical and
linguistic researchers can comb through billions of words to find these
terms. What researchers discovered is devastating. After a scrupulous
investigation of COFEA and COEME, Dennis Baron concluded that
“[f]ounding-era sources almost always use bear arms in an
unambiguously military sense.”60 Baron examined approximately 900
uses of the phrase “bear arms” and found only seven that were ambiguous
or non-military.61 He stated, “[n]on-military uses of bear arms in
reference to hunting or personal self-defense are not just rare, they are
almost nonexistent.”62
Lawyer and scholar, Neal Goldfarb, conducted his own review of the
COFEA and COEME resources, and concluded that: “as to almost every
important conclusion about the meaning of [the operative clause], Heller
was mistaken.”63 Goldfarb searched for all occurrences of the word
“arms” within four words of “bear” and its cognates. Of the 531 results,
nearly 95% used the phrase in a military sense; only 2% used the phrase
to mean carry weapons; and a meager 1.3% supported Heller’s holding
that the ordinary meaning of “bear arms” was to carry weapons for
personal confrontation.64 “Contrary to what the Court said in Heller,”
916 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“If history, and history alone, is what matters, why would
the Court not now reconsider Heller in light of these more recently published historical views?”).
58. Neal Goldfarb, Corpora and the Second Amendment: “bear arms” (part 1), plus a look
at “the people,” LAWNLINGUSTICS (Apr. 29, 2019), https://lawnlinguistics.com/2019/04/29/
corpora-and-the-second-amendment-bear-arms-part-1-plus-a-look-at-the-people/ (observing that
“in the decade since [Heller], information has become available” that now “render Heller’s
confident generalization about bear and arms untenable.”).
59. Brief for Professors of Linguistics and English Dennis E. Baron, Ph.D., Richard W.
Bailey, Ph.D. & Jeffrey P. Kaplan, Ph.D. In Support of Petitioners at 24, District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290).
60. Dennis Baron, Corpus Evidence Illuminates the Meaning of Bear Arms, 46 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 509, 510 (2019).
61. Id. at 510–11.
62. Id. at 510; see also Brief for Corpus Linguistics Professors and Experts as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 4, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 18280 (“[C]orpus linguistics researchers have unearthed a wealth of new evidence over the past
decade showing that the phrase ‘keep and bear arms’ overwhelmingly had a collective, militaristic
meaning at the Founding.”)
63. Brief of Neal Goldfarb as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Arguing that as to
the Second Amendment Issue, the Petition Should be Dismissed as Improvidently Granted at 2,
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 18-280.
64. Id. at 21; see also Neal Goldfarb, The Coming Corpus Based Reexamination of the
Second Amendment, LAWNLINGUISTICS (May 28, 2018), https://lawnlinguistics.com/2018/05/28/
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Goldfarb concludes, “there is reason to think that in the Second
Amendment, bear arms was used in its idiomatic military sense and that
it would have been understood as conveying that sense.”65
Professor Alison LaCroix, together with linguist, Dr. Jason Merchant,
searched the corpus on Google books for the term “bear arms” spanning
from 1760 to 1795. Of the 181 texts that came up positive, just over
67.4% used the term in a collective sense, just over 18% used it in an
individual sense, with the balance of usage undeterminable or heraldic.66
“[C]onsulting actual historical sources suggests that the context of the
Second Amendment had more to do with militias and magazines than
with solo householders,”67 LaCroix says. To most Founding-era English
speakers, it appears, “the phrase ‘bear arms’ referred to an activity
undertaken by groups of people, not only by individuals.”68
To their credit, individuals usually characterized as more gun-rights
leaning concede the new evidence places Heller’s historical justification
in doubt. Professors Josh Blackman and James C. Phillips have conducted
their own research on the corpus and have found that “the overwhelming
majority of instances of ‘bear arms’ was in the military context.”69
To be clear: it is not that the new evidence proves that “bear arms” is
exclusively or solely used in a collective, military sense, but it confirms
that the term is overwhelmingly used in a collective or military sense,
which is the touchstone of “ordinary” meaning.70 As Justice Scalia said
in Heller, the judge must give legal effect to typical use, not idiosyncratic

the-coming-corpus-based-reexamination-of-the-second-amendment/ (“[W]hat I’ve seen provides
a substantial basis for challenging Heller’s interpretation of keep and bear arms.”); see also
Goldfarb, supra note 58 (“[T]he corpus evidence points toward the conclusion that bear arms
unambiguously conveyed the military meaning that the Supreme Court rejected[.]”).
65. Brief of Neal Goldfarb as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Arguing that as to
the Second Amendment Issue, the Petition Should be Dismissed as Improvidently Granted, supra
note 63, at 17. Even if the term “bear arms” is ambiguous, Goldfarb notes, the prefatory clause
clarifies it as having a military, not a personal purposes meaning. See id. at 25–26.
66. LaCroix, supra note 33.
67. LaCroix, supra note 33.
68. LaCroix, supra note 33.
69. Josh Blackman & James C. Phillips, Corpus Linguistics and the Second Amendment,
HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Aug. 7, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/corpus-linguistics-andthe-second-amendment/.
70. Randy E. Barnett, Was the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in an
Organized Militia?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 237, 240 (2004) (advocating an “empirical” investigation of
“actual evidence of usage” to determine, as between different usages, “which meaning was
dominant”).
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or parochial use.71 The body of the distribution governs ordinary
meaning, not the tail.72
III. HELLER AND STARE DECISIS
So, if Heller appears to be so comprehensively wrong as a matter of
original public meaning, why not chuck it out? This would seem to be
Justice Thomas’s view. In his concurrence in Gamble v. United States73
last term, Thomas articulated a radical, but largely intellectually
consistent position on stare decisis.74 Where a decision is based on a
demonstrably inaccurate assessment of historical linguistic fact, the Court
is duty-bound to follow the original public meaning.75
In Gamble, the Court considered whether to retain the “separate
sovereigns” exception to the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy
Clause.76 Terence Gamble (Gamble) was caught as a felon in possession
of a firearm in violation of both Alabama state law and federal law.77
Gamble pleaded guilty and was convicted in state court; the United States
attorney then brought charges under the materially similar federal felonin-possession statute.78
Gamble argued that the Fifth Amendment’s text: “[N]or shall any
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb” precluded two prosecutions for essentially the same crime.79 The
majority opinion noted that over one hundred and seventy years of
precedent had upheld the “separate sovereigns” doctrine and that
Gamble’s “muddle[d],” “spotty,” and “equivocal” historical evidence
was insufficient to overcome the heavy presumption that it should be
retained.80
71. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576–77 (2008) (“Normal meaning may .
. . include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings that would not have
been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation.”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Heller,
HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L. REV. 145, 173 (2008).
72. Stefan Th. Gries & Brian G. Slocum, Ordinary Meaning and Corpus Linguistics, 2017
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1417, 1441 (2017) (“[F]requency is a crucial aspect of what distinguishes an
ordinary meaning from some meaning that is perhaps grammatical but unordinary.”); see also
Barnett, supra note 70, at 240 (“If possible, one should undertake a quantitative assessment to
distinguish normal from abnormal usage.”).
73. 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019).
74. See id. at 1981 (Thomas, J., concurring).
75. See id. at 1981–83.
76. Id. at 1964 (provides that the “dual sovereignty” principle allows for both state and
federal governments to prosecute the offender, where the same conduct violates both state and
federal law, without violating double jeopardy).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1965 n.1 (stating that the parties assumed that the elements of both crimes were
sufficiently similar to qualify as the “same offence”).
79. Id. at 1965.
80. Id. at 1969.
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Justice Gorsuch wrote a dissent, applying the conventional test for
when the Supreme Court should overturn its decisions, that is, “the
quality of the decision’s reasoning; its consistency with related decisions;
legal developments since the decision; and reliance on the decision.”81
He concluded that these “traditional” tools for giving effect to stare
decisis failed in this case.82
Justice Thomas concurred. Like the majority, he found the
defendant’s historical evidence unpersuasive on the meaning of the
Double Jeopardy Clause.83 But he used most of his opinion to announce
a revolutionary view of horizontal stare decisis in the Supreme Court.
According to Thomas, the “Court’s typical formulation of the stare
decisis standard does not comport with our judicial duty under Article III
because it elevates demonstrably erroneous decisions—meaning
decisions outside the realm of permissible interpretation—over the text
of the Constitution and other duly enacted federal law.”84
According to Thomas, our system is one of written law, not common
law, and depends on a “key premise that words, including written laws,
are capable of objective, ascertainable meaning.”85 That objective
meaning is “the original understanding of the relevant legal text.”86 The
original understanding is the only thing that is law. And because our
written Constitution “is supreme over other sources of law, it requires us
to privilege its text over our own precedents when the two are in
conflict.”87 His prescription was blunt: “When faced with a demonstrably
erroneous precedent, my rule is simple: We should not follow it.”88
Nutty?89 Perhaps. But if originalism is something other than a form of
identity politics,90 or an intellectual disguise for political preference,91
then we must contend with Justice Thomas’s challenge. And what better

81. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 2006 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1980 (Thomas, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 1981.
85. Id. at 1984.
86. Id. at 1985.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1984.
89. As Justice Scalia explained: “I am a textualist. I am an originalist. I am not a nut.” Nina
Totenberg, Justice Scalia, the Great Dissenter, Opens Up, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 28, 2008,
7:32AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=89986017.
90. Jamal Greene et al., Profiling Originalism, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 356, 400 (2011)
(Identifying a preference for originalism where “irrespective of its particulars as a modality of
legal analysis or . . . results . . . in actual cases, originalism is selected because it resonates with a
set of cultural values that the respondent finds compelling.”).
91. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional Theories
Principled, or Are They Rationalizations for Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5
(2011).
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way to sort out the consequences of this radical view of precedent and
originalism, than as applied to one of originalism’s darlings?
One response to Thomas is that Heller’s interpretation of “bear arms”
is not “demonstrably erroneous” but falls within some band of what
Thomas calls “honest disagreement” about the text’s meaning.92 This
response presumes that there is a criterion for how large the “room for
honest disagreement” should be.93
Common intuitions could supply the range of acceptable
interpretations. For example, consider the terms “domestic violence” and
“republican form of government” from Article IV. Intuitively, although
rare uses of “domestic violence” could mean intra-family violence in
1791, it would seem strange that outliers could justify the
constitutionality of federal military intervention in a case of spousal
abuse.94 Similarly, it feels odd to suggest Congress can impose one-party
rule under the Guarantee Clause because a handful of partisans used
“republican” to refer to a specific political party, rather than to a form of
representative government. One answer would be that nothing about the
Heller interpretation falls outside common intuitions about the band of
disagreement, and so Heller is not a “demonstrably erroneous” precedent.
But the hazard of intuitions about reasonable disagreement is that they
can become infected with post-hoc reasoning or presentist assumptions
about usage.95 Furthermore, if outlier uses of “bear arms” to mean “to
bear arms for personal purposes” can create a zone of acceptable
disagreement, then why can those same justifications not apply to
“domestic violence” or “republican form of government” in Article IV?
If reasonable disagreement about historical fact is nothing more than the
perception of the judge, then much of the objective grounding originalism
is meant to provide is illusory.96
But we need not rely solely on intuition. If statistical methods can
provide information about language use; can they not also provide
metrics for zones of reasonable disagreement? Instead of intuition, we
could pin “honest disagreement” to something slightly more quantitative,
like conventions among empiricists to determine whether the use falls
92. See Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1986 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Although precedent does not
supersede the original meaning of a legal text, it may remain relevant when it is not demonstrably
erroneous.”).
93. See Gries & Slocum, supra note 72, at 1434 (suggesting standard for ordinary meaning
is a normative matter that can be informed, but not dictated, by linguistics).
94. See Thomas Lee & James C. Phillips, Data Driven Originalism, 167 U. PENN. L. REV.
261, 299 (2019) (finding that just under two percent of the use of “domestic violence” in period
before 1979 was “indeterminate”).
95. Id. at 288 (“Judges of our era are much more likely to be affected by our sense of
contemporary usage, and thus to miss the effect of [linguistic] drift.”).
96. Id. at 289 (cautioning that judicial intuitions about usage “are likely to be affected
by . . . biases”).
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within some statistically accepted grouping of normality, whether it
appears in the tail, or whether it is an outlier.97 If that is the criteria, the
evidence is pretty clear that speakers of English in 1791 overwhelmingly
use “bear arms” to mean a military or collective activity, as opposed to a
personal activity. “Bear arms” to mean non-collective use is rare, and for
use for personal purposes, extremely rare to non-existent.
In sum, unless the range of possible interpretations over the 1791
meaning of “bear arms” is particularly broad—broader perhaps than the
range supplied to other constitutional terms—it appears that “bear arms”
to mean carry weapons for personal confrontation does not fall within the
scope of “honest disagreement,” at least as an originalist matter.
Alternatively, Heller could have achieved the status of “superprecedent.” Scholars offer a number of different descriptions of superprecedents. Michael Sinclair describes them as “judicially unshakeable,
a precedential monument which may not be gainsaid, akin to having the
statute-like force of vertical stare decisis horizontally.”98 Daniel Farber
calls super-precedent “bedrock precedent” that have “become the
foundation for large areas of important doctrine;” whose overturning
would “create just the kind of uncertainty and instability that
constitutions . . . are designed to avoid.”99 Michael Gerhardt defines
super-precedent as those constitutional decisions that:
(1) have endured over time; (2) political institutions
repeatedly have endorsed and supported; (3) have influenced
or shaped doctrine in at least one area of constitutional law;
(4) have enjoyed, in one form or another, widespread social
acquiescence; and (5) are widely recognized by the courts as
no longer meriting the expenditure of scarce judicial
resources.100
Bruce Ackerman identifies super-precedents as those decisions that
“crystallize fixed points in our constitutional tradition” which often have
a greater weight than even the written text and which “should not be
overruled or ignored in the course of doctrinal development.”101 The
common thread among these descriptions is that a super-precedent has
become so integral to the American constitutional imagination that it
97. See id. at 289–90, 293 (noting that advantage of reviewing a corpus linguistics for
meaning is that it can be replicated and falsified).
98. Michael Sinclair, Precedent, Super-Precedent, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363, 365
(2007).
99. Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1173,
1181 (2006).
100. Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1213 (2006).
101. Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1752 (2007)
(“[S]uperprecedents resemble formal amendments, which play a similar shaping role in the
operational canon.”).
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either cannot be overturned at all, or it can be overturned only after some
extraordinary justification.102
Cases dealing with constitutional structure, including cases on judicial
review or federalism are frequently thought of as super–precedential.103
Other super–precedents are so entrenched that reconsideration would be
cataclysmic—the cases declaring paper money constitutional, for
example.104 Some others, dealing with individual rights, have acquired
such a mystique that their rightness cannot be questioned, and, indeed,
constitutional methodology must be made to square with it. Brown v.
Board of Education is such a case.105
Depending on the framework, Heller, like Obergefell v. Hodges,106 or
Roe v. Wade,107 satisfies the test for super-precedent. Heller certainly has
acquired a mystique. In some social and political circles, questioning the
rightness of Heller is akin to questioning the rightness of Brown. The core
holding of Heller, that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep
and bear arms in the home for personal purposes like self-defense, is
broadly popular and accepted.108 It has obtained the express or tacit
endorsement of many political leaders, from President Barack Obama109
to local sheriffs.110 If the unanimous decision in Caetano v.
Massachusetts is any indication, there may be some acquiescence on the
Court to its permanence, even among the Heller dissenters.111
But along other metrics, Heller, like Obergefell and Roe, fails as
super-precedent. Heller is only ten years old (although there is no
specific time frame by which a decision can obtain super–precedent
status). It is a deeply polarizing opinion, with some individuals and

102. I explore this idea merely as a descriptive statement. I have no commitments at present
on what, if anything, should qualify as super-precedent.
103. See Gerhardt, supra note 100, at 1208–09 (identifying Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803) and Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) in this vein).
104. See Farber, supra note 99, at 1181–82 (citing the Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.)
457 (1870)).
105. 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
106. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
107. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
108. See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 11, at 177–78.
109. BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 11, at 177–78.
110. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Irrepressibility of Precedent, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1279, 1293
(2008) (“Nothing becomes a superprecedent, at least in my judgment, unless it has been widely
and uniformly accepted by public authorities generally, including the Court, the President, and
Congress.”).
111. See Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1027 (2016) (per curium) (“The Court
has held that ‘the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute
bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding’ . . . .” (quoting
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008))).
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groups, including the late Justice Stevens calling for its reversal.112 Heller
is not yet quite as legally (as opposed to politically) foundational to
constitutional and sub-constitutional law in the same way that the Fourth
Amendment case Mapp v. Ohio113 is to criminal procedure, for
instance.114 In terms of legal impact, Heller has been relatively minor,
striking down mostly outlier regulations, rather than restructuring the
broad swath of American firearms regulation or recalibrating all of
American self-defense law.115
Of course, to a stout-hearted originalist, whether Heller is ordinary,
super-, or super-duper116 precedent should not matter. To conform to
demonstrably wrong precedent in defiance of the original understanding
of the text is to exceed one’s authority and violate one’s constitutional
duty.
A final response would be to reject Thomas’s critique entirely,
embrace “faint-hearted” originalism (or non-originalism) and apply stare
decisis even for “demonstrably erroneous” precedent. Joseph Blocher and
I have already written extensively that we do not think that conventional
applications of stare decisis justify overturning Heller.117 However,
rejecting Thomas’s premise altogether just leads us back into the debate
currently in the Court over stare decisis itself, its constraining power, its
relationship to originalism, and its equal application irrespective of
political ideology.
IV. OWNING HELLER
Justice Scalia ended his Heller opinion by professing humility (and
framing the dissenters as radicals): “Constitutional rights are enshrined
with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted
them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even future judges think
that scope too broad.”118 Although “[w]e are aware of the problem of
handgun violence in this country,” he wrote, “what is not debatable is that
it is not the role of this Court to pronounce the Second Amendment
112. See John Paul Stevens, Repeal the Second Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/opinion/john-paul-stevens-repeal-second-amendment.html.
113. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
114. See Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 TEX. L. REV.
1711, 1734 (2013) (identifying Mapp among the “hit[s]” of super-precedent).
115. See Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of
the Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, 1507 (2018) (discussing win
rates of litigants).
116. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 145 (2005)
(statement of Sen. Arlen Specter, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“[W]ould you think that
Roe might be a super-duper precedent in light . . . of 38 occasions to overrule it?”).
117. BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 11, at 180–82.
118. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008).
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extinct.”119 To non-originalists and Heller skeptics, this is likely the most
grating part of the opinion, a revolution in Second Amendment doctrine
sold as conservation.120 (Although, to be fair, this is the rhetorical
maneuver of nearly all revolutionaries.)121
Justice Scalia’s blame-the-Founders language exhibits what David
Kairys and Judge Richard Posner have described as “the law made me do
it” instincts of judicial officers.122 Judges, including Justices, often want
to foist responsibility for their decisions onto some other decisionmaker—in this case, 1791 English-speakers.123 If this new research on
the Second Amendment is right, it will not do to continue saying “My
hands are tied—this is what 1791 English–speakers understood” because
they did not. And if that is the case, then one thing becomes inescapable:
the Court owns Heller.
The corollary is that the Court owns everything that Heller begets, for
good or ill. As Justice Kennedy once wrote “[t]he justifications for the
case system and stare decisis . . . rest[s] upon the Court’s capacity, and
responsibility, to acknowledge its missteps. It is our duty to face up to
adverse, unintended consequences flowing from our own prior
decisions.”124 Justice Scalia was never afraid to suggest that the Court
should own the consequences of its doctrine, especially if he thought the
majority got it wrong.125 If there are adverse, unintended consequences,
and the original understanding does not require them, then the Court must
figure out what is the best method for mitigating them.
None of this means that Heller is or should be overturned. There are
other justifications, apart from original meaning, to retain Heller. But it
does suggest that the Court cannot wash its hands of the doctrine if it is
shoddy, unworkable, or suboptimal. Neither does owning Heller mean
that the Justices must become super-legislators and traffic in non-legal

119. Id. at 636.
120. This trope is common regardless of the ideology of the constitutional change that takes
place. See Farber, supra note 99, at 1175 n.12 (“Like many who seek radical social
change . . . those who attack basic precedents claim only to be restoring a ‘true’ but forgotten
social order.”).
121. 2 SIMON SCHAMA, A HISTORY OF BRITAIN: THE BRITISH WARS 1603–1776 109 (2001)
(“Revolutions invariably begin by sounding conservative and nostalgic, their protagonists
convinced that they are suppressing, not unloosing, innovation.”).
122. DAVID KAIRYS ET AL., THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE viii (David
Kairys ed., 3d ed. 2010); Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100
CALIF. L. REV. 519, 520 (2012) (referring to one type of judicial restraint as “the law made me do
it”).
123. KAIRYS ET AL., supra note 122; Posner, supra note 122.
124. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 406 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
125. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 497 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“No reasons are given
for this result; no acknowledgment of its consequences made.”).
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tools to craft their decisions.126 A court can bear responsibility for its
decisions and still operate within the role morality that makes judicial
decision-making different from legislative or executive decisionmaking.127 But it does mean that the Court must think and consider very
carefully how it treads in this area when some clear justification is absent.
Applying Lawrence Solum’s terminology, the post-Heller linguistic
research suggests all of Heller now operates within the “construction
zone.”128 Any cue the Justices wish to take from the original
understanding of the text must take into account that Heller’s conclusion
about the original understanding of the text is almost certainly wrong.
That means the plurality of different methodological tools available to the
judge—not just text—is required to craft a workable doctrine. The
product of this construction can be more or less deferential to political
branches; it can be more or less cognizant of expert opinion on
consequences; it can be more or less attentive to the effects on other
constitutional institutions and actors.
My colleague, Neil Siegel, has written extensively about judicial
statesmanship, and it seems particularly apt here. Whatever kind of tools
the Justices use to fashion doctrine after Heller—whether they look to
text, history, tradition, prudence, precedent or any of the recognized
judicial modalities—the Justices must adopt an “ethic of
responsibility”129 and that puts them squarely “responsible for—as author
of—the reasonably foreseeable social consequences of their official
actions.”130 Heller’s legacy will be judged, not on how well it comports
with the past, but how well the Justices direct its future.

126. Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 989 (2008)
(stating that judicial statesmanship does not require achieving results with “reasoning
inconsistent” with the reasoning common to the profession); cf. RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES
THINK 252–53 (2008).
127. See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 11, at 123; see generally PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 125–26 (1982).
128. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 453, 472 (2013) (“The construction zone consists of constitutional cases or issues that cannot
be resolved by the direct translation of the constitutional text into rules of constitutional law that
determine their outcome.”).
129. Siegel, supra note 126, at 997 (quoting MAX WEBER, POLITICS AS A VOCATION 47 (H.H.
Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans., Fortress Press 1965) (1919)).
130. Siegel, supra note 126, at 997.

